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Abstract
When reporting scientific information, journalists often present common 
myths that are refuted with scientific facts. However, correcting misinformation 
this way is often not only ineffective but can increase the likelihood that 
people misremember it as true. We test this backfire effect in the context 
of journalistic coverage and examine how to counteract it. In a web-based 
experiment, we find evidence for a systematic backfire effect that occurs 
after a few minutes and strengthens after five days. Results show that forming 
judgments immediately during reception (in contrast to memory-based) 
can reduce backfire effects and prevent erroneous memory from affecting 
participants’ attitudes.
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Once people have been confronted with a piece of information, it is hard to 
erase it—even if it turns out that the information was incorrect. One example 
of this is the so-called MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine contro-
versy: At the end of the 1990s, a study erroneously reported that the com-
bined MMR vaccination could cause autism. Though the study turned out to 
be fraudulent and many disclaimer campaigns were launched, a lot of people 
still believe that this risk exists (Hargreaves, Lewis, & Speers, 2003; Nyhan, 
Reifler, Richey, & Freed, 2014). From a normative perspective, it is, espe-
cially in the fields of politics and health, important that citizens are well and 
correctly informed, because they base far-reaching, momentous decisions on 
information that they assume to be true (for the distinction between being 
misinformed and being uninformed, see Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder, 
& Rich, 2000). Hence, it is in the public interest to reduce the “widespread 
prevalence and persistence of misinformation in contemporary societies” 
(Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012, p. 106).
Therefore, many information campaigns try to correct misinformation, 
often by picking up on certain myths and rectifying them immediately. Such 
debunking campaigns are not only common in the context of health informa-
tion but also can be found regarding political issues (“Top 10 Myths About 
Immigration,” Anchondo, 2010; “The Top 10 Myths About TTIP,” European 
Union, 2015). Apart from that, these kinds of “myths and facts stories” have 
become increasingly present in journalistic coverage (e.g., when reporting 
new scientific results that contradict certain prevalent myths); for instance, 
the Washington Post regularly publishes “Five myths about . . .” articles, 
where it debunks myths about all kind of topics.
Myths and facts stories have a common underlying structure: usually, the 
myth is presented in form of a highlighted statement (e.g., “We only use 10% 
of our brains” or “Earth is closer to the sun during summer”), followed by a 
longer passage that debunks it and contains scientific data about the actual 
situation. In many cases, the myth is directly followed by a short debunking 
claim such as “False!”.
Although myths and facts stories are clearly designed to debunk common 
myths existing in the population, research shows that this procedure might 
have the opposite effect, because disclaimers do not always lead to a rectifi-
cation, but sometimes to a solidification of the myth: “Attempts to warn peo-
ple about false information can backfire and unintentionally increase people’s 
acceptance of the false information as true” (Skurnik, Yoon, & Schwarz, 
2007, p. 4). This backfire effect can be momentous, especially when people 
base judgments on their erroneous memory.
While there is some research describing and analyzing the backfire effect, 
to our knowledge, there are no studies examining how to counteract it. In the 
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present study, we propose that the judgment-formation strategy might help 
reduce backfire error. Research on judgment-formation distinguishes between 
two types of strategies (Hastie & Park, 1986; Matthes, Wirth, & Schemer, 
2007): Immediate judgments are formed during the reception of information, 
meaning that people form judgments about an issue the moment they encounter 
information about it and store this judgment. If people using this strategy are 
asked for their opinion at a later point in time, they recall this previously formed 
judgment, but not the arguments that led to it. Memory-based judgments, on the 
other hand, are only formed when people are asked for them; therefore, people 
using this strategy do not form judgments during the reception process. We 
assume that forming judgments during reception can reduce the risk of backfire 
effects, since recipients can use their attitude toward that specific issue as a 
retrieval cue to determine the truth of a statement. This article first explains the 
backfire effect as well as the judgment-formation strategies and reports on the 
conducting of an experiment that tested our assumptions.
The Backfire Effect
The backfire effect describes the phenomenon that rectifying misinformation 
can have the opposite effect and lead recipients to misremember the false 
information as true (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; 
Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007; Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 
2005). Thus, debunking false information can actually strengthen the belief 
in its truth (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). Skurnik 
et al. (2005) demonstrate this paradoxical effect with warnings about false 
statements: They presented participants with claims about health and nutri-
tion, with each claim labeled as true or false directly after the presentation 
(e.g., “Aspirin destroys tooth enamel,” p. 715). Later, participants were asked 
to indicate whether each statement (and several statements that were not actu-
ally presented in the stimulus) was true, false, or new. The authors compared 
backfire errors (labeling originally false statements as true) with the opposite 
errors (labeling originally true statements as false). If people solely made 
random errors, they should have equally often remembered facts as false and 
myths as true. Yet, participants significantly more often misremembered 
myths as facts than the other way around. This effect was even more pro-
nounced after a 3-day delay. Skurnik et al. (2007) replicated these findings in 
the context of health campaigns: They showed their participants “Myth&Facts” 
flyers about the flu vaccine. While participants made hardly any mistakes 
directly after exposure to the flyer, the backfire effect emerged after a 30-min-
ute delay, with people misremembering significantly more myths as true than 
facts as false.
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Why do people, after some time has passed, tend to believe that a state-
ment is true, even though it was clearly indicated as being false? The occur-
rence of this backfire effect is based on two processes: first, on increasing 
processing fluency through the (repeated) presentation of a statement, which 
leads to higher credibility (Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977; Parks & 
Toth, 2006; Reber & Schwarz, 1999). Second, the backfire effect is based on 
the fact that memory for contextual details fades off faster than for the infor-
mation itself.
Process 1: Enhanced Feeling of Familiarity
If people were asked to judge the validity of the statement, “The mortality 
rate of bowel cancer is 18%,” only a few experts would be able to tell without 
any doubt whether this claim was really true. Those without any expert 
knowledge could check whether they had heard this statement before (Arkes, 
Boehm, & Xu, 1991; Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 1989; Schwartz, 1982): 
Does this claim sound familiar? If recipients believe that they have encoun-
tered it before, they are more inclined to believe it. This phenomenon is 
known as the truth effect (e.g., Arkes et al., 1989; Bacon, 1979; Begg, Anas, 
& Farinacci, 1992; Boehm, 1994; Gigerenzer, 1984; Hasher et al., 1977; 
Koch & Zerback, 2013; a meta-analysis by Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & 
Wänke, 2010, confirms the stability of this effect).
Familiarity is considered as the key determinant of the truth effect. The 
familiarity hypothesis is based on two mechanisms following each other: In 
a first step, every contact with a stimulus increases its processing fluency, 
which means it can be processed more easily after the first reception 
(Bornstein, 1989; Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004; Reber, Winkielman, 
& Schwarz, 1998). In a second step, this enhanced processing fluency trig-
gers a feeling of familiarity and leads participants to believe that they have 
heard or seen this statement before (Parks & Toth, 2006; Reber & Schwarz, 
1999; Unkelbach, 2007). Unkelbach (2006, 2007) offers an explanation as to 
why processing fluency makes a statement seem more credible. He shows 
that recipients learn in everyday life that processing fluency correlates with 
the validity of messages. People trust in the heuristic that true statements 
have a higher probability of being repeated, whereas false statements are not 
passed on (Unkelbach, 2007; Unkelbach, Bayer, Alves, Koch, & Stahl, 2011). 
Thus, the feeling of familiarity finally leads to higher credibility (Parks & 
Toth, 2006; Reber & Schwarz, 1999).
For the occurrence of these processes, it is irrelevant whether the state-
ments are factually true or false (Gigerenzer, 1984; Hasher et al., 1977); the 
truth effect occurs regardless of whether statements were initially rated as 
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credible or questionable (Arkes et al., 1989). The effect even occurs when the 
credibility of statements is actively put into question beforehand (Begg, 
Armour, & Kerr, 1985). Generally, the truth effect is more pronounced if 
respondents are unsure about the validity of statements (Roggeveen & Johar, 
2002; Unkelbach, 2007).
Process 2: Short-Lasting Memory for Context Information
The truth effect explains why the (repeated) presentation of a statement leads 
recipients to believe that it is true. However, it does not explain why this 
effect is also triggered when people are explicitly warned that a certain piece 
of information is not true. Here, a second process comes into play: The speed 
of forgetting differs between context information (e.g., additional informa-
tion that a statement is true or false) and the information itself. Even if some 
time has passed, people implicitly sense that they have encountered a state-
ment before, while the memory for context information vanishes more 
quickly (Mandler, 1980; Skurnik et al., 2005). Thus, recognizing that a state-
ment has been encountered before is easier than remembering the exact con-
text in which the statement was presented (Mandler, 1980). The existence of 
this process is confirmed in several studies showing that warnings about false 
claims or correcting misinformation have the desired effect directly after 
exposure to the information, but that after a delay, contextual information 
fades, “leaving only enhanced familiarity” (Skurnik et al., 2005, p. 722).
Taking both processes together, after some time and/or distraction, the 
specific recall of the context vanishes and recipients start forgetting whether 
a claim was actually labeled as true or false. Now, they rely on the heuristic 
that a claim that sounds familiar will probably be true (Hasher et al., 1977); 
the backfire effect is triggered. Based on these considerations, we expect that 
rectifying false claims enhances backfire effects: Reading statements explic-
itly labeled as true or false leads people to more often misremember false 
information as true than true information as false (Hypothesis 1a). In line 
with the studies reported above, we expect this effect to strengthen after a 
delay (Hypothesis 1b).
Backfire errors can be momentous when people base attitudes and/or deci-
sions on misinformation they erroneously remember as true. Thus, it is not 
only necessary to investigate whether the rectification of misinformation can 
backfire but also how this affects people’s attitudes. The only study to inves-
tigate participants’ judgments in the context of the backfire effect, conducted 
by Skurnik et al. (2007; see above), yielded ambiguous results: While the 
different flyers (the “Facts-and-Myths” flyer vs. the “Only-Facts” flyer) did 
not affect participants’ intentions, it affected participants’ risk perceptions. 
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Furthermore, the authors only checked for differences in risk perceptions 
between the flyer groups, but they did not examine whether the number of 
backfire errors actually caused these effects. In the present study, we want to 
focus on this connection: We predict a positive correlation between the 
valence of the false statements misremembered as facts and people’s attitudes 
(Hypothesis 1c). For example, the more the myth with a negative valence 
people misremember as true (e.g., “Side effects of the flu vaccination are 
worse than the flu”), the more negative their attitude toward the flu vaccina-
tion should become.
This relationship should be especially pronounced for people who strongly 
base their attitudes on the information they (mis-)remember when forming a 
judgment. However, research on social cognition shows that people do not 
always form their attitudes like this (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986): Depending 
on the judgment-formation strategy people apply, they either form judgments 
during reception or only at the time the judgment is actually needed; thus, 
people rely more or less on the single arguments that they remember. 
Consequently, we assume that the judgment-formation strategy could play an 
important role in the occurrence of backfire errors and their prevention.
Judgment-Formation Strategy: Immediate Versus 
Memory-Based Judgments
A large body of research has dealt with how people process information to 
form judgments. In this context, researchers have developed different models 
to describe two modes of cognitive processing and decision making (e.g., 
Chaiken, 1980; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), 
which are commonly labeled as dual process theories (Evans, 2008). While 
these theories usually deal with how information is processed when judg-
ments are formed (fast/heuristic/automatic vs. slow/systematic/controlled), 
research on judgment-formation strategy investigates when judgments are 
actually formed (Mackie & Asuncion, 1990).
When asked for a judgment on an issue, in some cases people recall infor-
mation that they have encountered on the topic and then base their judgment 
on the arguments that they remember. This strategy is called forming mem-
ory-based judgments (Hastie & Park, 1986; Lavine, 2002). Since the judg-
ment is based predominantly on arguments that people can recall at the time 
the judgment is needed, the resulting attitudes can be rather unstable: 
“Memory-based judgments are based on whatever information comes to mind 
at the time of judgment” (Matthes et al., 2007, pp. 247-248). This can result in 
different attitudes on the same issue at different points in time since memory-
based judgments are prone to recency, availability, and salience effects (Hastie 
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& Park, 1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The main characteristic of this 
judgment-formation strategy is that people encode and store the information 
presented, but they do not form judgments at that point in time (Matthes 
et al., 2007). This strategy is especially applied when the individual is 
unaware that the information is needed for a future judgment (Hastie & Park, 
1986).
Apart from these memory-based judgments, there is a second judgment-
formation strategy that has been referred to as on-line judgments (Bizer, 
Tormala, Rucker, & Petty, 2006; Hastie & Park, 1986). These judgments are 
formed immediately during the reception of information; we will refer to this 
strategy as immediate judgments.1 They are formed and stored in memory 
when information on an issue is actually encountered. When people applying 
this strategy are asked for their attitudes later, they only recall the attitude 
itself but not the single arguments that led to it (Srull & Wyer, 1989). 
Consequently, the attitude and the recalled arguments do not have to correlate 
(Hastie & Park, 1986; Matthes et al., 2007). The reason for this is what 
Anderson (1981) called the two-memory hypothesis: Single arguments are 
stored in a different memory system than the actual judgment. For this rea-
son, even if memory for the single argument fades, people can still recall the 
judgment that they have formed. This also means that attitudes formed during 
reception are more stable over time and independent of what arguments can 
be remembered at the time a judgment is needed (Bizer et al., 2006). 
Nevertheless, Hastie and Park (1986) stress that there can be a relationship 
between the valence of the judgment and the recalled arguments for people 
with immediate judgments since they can use their existing attitudes as 
retrieval cues (“judgment causes memory,” p. 259). For example, a more 
positive attitude might lead people to remember predominantly positive argu-
ments through biased encoding.
Most of the research on judgment-formation strategies has been conducted 
using experimental settings: Participants are presented with the same stimu-
lus, yet the judgment-formation strategy is manipulated via different tasks. 
As one of the first studies to compare both judgment strategies, Hastie and 
Park (1986) presented their participants with a description of a fictitious per-
son. Participants in the immediate judgment group were told that they should 
form an impression of the person (e.g., his personality and likeability). In 
contrast, participants that were not to form a judgment during reception (= 
memory-based) were presented with a distraction task: They were asked to 
judge the grammaticality of each sentence. According to Hastie and Park 
(1986), a distraction task is necessary since an experimental situation almost 
automatically evokes immediate judgments—a problem they encountered in 
previous experiments. Results showed strong correlations between the recall 
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of specific information about the fictitious person and attitudes toward him 
for the memory-based judgment strategy, but not for the immediate judgment 
strategy.
Subsequent studies adopted Hastie and Park’s operationalization of the 
judgment-formation tasks (Bizer et al., 2006; Hamilton, Sherman, & Maddox, 
1999; Mackie & Asuncion, 1990; Tormala & Petty, 2001). Tormala and Petty 
(2001), for instance, showed participants statements about a person and asked 
participants in the immediate judgment condition to form an impression of 
the person, whereas the memory-based task was to focus on the sentences, 
and whether they were simple or complex in nature. Similarly, Mackie and 
Asuncion (1990) presented participants with arguments about standardized 
tests for admission to college generated by fellow students. To evoke imme-
diate judgments, participants were asked to “pay attention to the strength of 
arguments the student uses and to how well this student can support his or her 
position” (p. 7). For a memory-based judgment strategy, participants were told 
“that we were interested in how dynamically the other student expressed his or 
her opinion” (p. 7). All these studies manipulated the judgment-formation 
strategies in experimental settings; however, Matthes et al. (2007) were the 
first to actually measure judgment-formation strategies via self-reports. They 
developed items for both strategies (e.g., immediate judgment: “Intuitively, I 
knew from the beginning on how I stood on that issue,” p. 253).
In summary, the main difference between both judgment-formation strate-
gies is the point in time when a judgment is formed. This has several conse-
quences that might be relevant for the occurrence of the backfire effect: It is 
plausible that memory-based judgments will lead to more backfire errors 
than immediate judgments since people with immediate judgments can use 
their attitude as a retrieval cue for remembering if statements were true or 
false (Hastie & Park, 1986). If, for example, a person with a positive attitude 
on flu vaccination does not remember if the statement “The side effects are 
worse than the flu” was true or false, he or she can use the recalled attitude as 
an anchor: Why would I hold a positive attitude toward flu vaccination if side 
effects were worse than the flu? Consequently, if they have formed a favor-
able attitude in the first place, it is likely that they will judge this statement as 
false. Based on that, we predict that people applying a memory-based judg-
ment strategy will make more backfire errors than people forming immediate 
judgments (Hypothesis 2a). Furthermore, results by Skurnik et al. (2005, 
2007) suggest that this difference will be more pronounced after a delay 
(Hypothesis 2b).
Moreover, the relationship between memory and attitudes predicted in 
Hypothesis 1c could depend on the judgment-formation strategy that is 
applied: People that have already formed and stored an attitude during the 
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reception of specific information (= immediate judgment) can recall this very 
attitude when asked for it; this implies that their judgments should be stable 
over time (Hastie & Park, 1986). People with a memory-based judgment 
strategy, however, have not formed and stored an attitude during reception; 
when asked for it, they need to recall information about the issue and base 
their attitude on the arguments that they can remember (Matthes et al., 2007). 
Thus, their attitudes should be less stable and affected by (erroneous) mem-
ory for information about the issue. If people were to assess their attitudes 
shortly after reception and again after a delay, we predict that there will be a 
stronger correlation between both judgments for people applying the imme-
diate judgment strategy than for those with the memory-based judgment 
strategy (Hypothesis 2c). In line with this, we assume that after a delay, the 
attitudes of people with a memory-based judgment strategy will be affected 
by backfire effects, while the attitudes of people forming immediate judg-
ments will not be affected by backfire effects (Hypothesis 2d).
Method
Participants
We recruited 335 participants (57.9% female; age: M = 41.34 years, SD = 
16.23) through an online access panel for social science research (SoSci 
Panel; Leiner, 2012, 2014). The panel is noncommercial, and its members 
agreed to participate in scientific surveys. It is managed by a researcher of the 
University of Munich and includes around 100,000 panelists from Germany, 
Austria, and the German-speaking part of Switzerland. For the present exper-
iment, we only invited panelists from Germany; this sample is, however, not 
representative of the German population, as members are younger and better 
educated. Nevertheless, compared to traditional student samples, the SoSci 
Panel offers more heterogeneous samples regarding age, education, geogra-
phy, and personal interest. For more information on the composition and 
limitations of the SoSci Panel, see Leiner (2014). Participation was unpaid 
and voluntary. Respondents were informed that all of their responses were 
confidential.
Procedure and Stimulus
Participants were told that the study was about journalistic myths and facts 
stories, a specific type of article, where journalists pick up different claims 
circulating about a certain issue and explain whether these claims are false 
(myths) or true (facts). After this short introduction, all respondents were 
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informed that they would see three newspaper articles, which they should 
read carefully. The first and the last article served as distraction articles and 
reported about building a new city hall in a small town (Article 1) and about 
powering down public lighting systems at night in a German municipality 
(Article 3). The stimulus was Article 2, which reported about a new bowel 
cancer test that could be done at home. Thus, we wanted to ensure that par-
ticipants did not focus closely on the stimulus article and that some time had 
passed between reading the stimulus article and the questions relating to 
memory and attitudes.
The stimulus article started with a short introduction explaining that there 
is a new bowel cancer test to detect tumors of the colon and rectum. The test 
was described as being easy to do at home: one has to place small samples of 
a stool on special cards and send them to a laboratory for analysis. After this 
introduction, the journalist reported eight scientific statements about the test 
and identified each statement immediately as true or false, followed by a 
short explanation (e.g., “The bowel cancer test is more effective than conven-
tional screenings”—“False! The colonoscopy is the most effective screening 
method available”). Four of the statements were identified as being false; 
four of them were identified as being true. We made sure that statements 
labeled as true were indeed objectively true and statements labeled as false 
were indeed objectively false (we checked the truth on the website of a 
national institute for health care).
The article presented the new test in a rather negative light, for example, 
by identifying three of the statements in favor of the test as being false. This 
is an important difference to the study by Skurnik et al. (2007), as they labeled 
only negative statements as being myths (e.g., “Side effects of the flu vacci-
nation are worse than the flu”). Yet, studies in the context of framing research 
have shown that negative statements are judged to be more credible than 
positive ones (Hilbig, 2009, 2012; Koch, Peter, & Obermaier, 2013). After 
the stimulus presentation, we tested participants’ memory for the statements 
as well as their attitudes toward the test. Additionally, we collected sociode-
mographic data and items to check whether our manipulation was successful 
(see Measures). Subsequently, participants viewed a debriefing message with 
additional information about the real purpose of the experiment.
Design
To test our hypotheses, we varied two factors: first, we manipulated the two 
different judgment-formation strategies (immediate vs. memory-based judg-
ments). Analogously to other experiments on judgment-formation (e.g., Bizer 
et al., 2006; Hastie & Park, 1986; Mackie & Asuncion, 1990; Tormala & Petty, 
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2001), we showed participants different instructions prior to the stimulus: For 
immediate judgments (Condition 1), we told participants that we were inter-
ested in their opinion about the topics of the three articles and that we would 
ask questions about their opinion afterward; we asked them to decide how 
they felt about each topic while reading the articles. For memory-based judg-
ments (Condition 2), we told participants that we were interested in the lin-
guistic and journalistic quality of the articles, and that we would ask questions 
about the quality of the article afterward; we asked them to decide how they 
felt about the journalistic quality while reading the articles. Both groups were 
to read the stimulus thoroughly. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the two conditions. Both groups did not differ significantly regarding gen-
der, χ2(N = 335) = 0.55, p = .51, age, t(333) = 0.56, p = .58, education, χ2(N = 
335) = 7.55, p = .11, and regarding the time they spent reading the article, 
t(333) = 0.86, p = .39.
Second, to test whether effects strengthen over time, we employed a repeated 
measurement: participants answered questions a few minutes after the stimulus 
presentation and again after a delay of a few days (the minimum delay was 2 
days, M = 5.20, SD = 1.47). Since the study was designed as a web-based 
experiment, the time period between both measurements varied to some 
extent—we will consider this in the Results section. In both questionnaires, we 
asked for memory regarding the truth of the statements, attitudes toward the 
test, as well as questions regarding the judgment-formation strategy.
Measures
To measure memory for the truth of the statements, we presented the eight 
statements shown in our stimulus along with four new claims. For each claim, 
we asked participants to indicate whether it was labeled as “true” or “false” 
in the article or whether it had not been presented in the article (“new”).
Attitudes toward the new bowel cancer test were measured by a three-item 
semantic differential: “I believe that the presented bowel cancer test is . . .” 
“not appropriate vs. appropriate,” “bad vs. good,” and “not reasonable vs. 
reasonable” (t1: M = 3.10, SD = 1.11, α = .92; t2: M = 3.24, SD = 1.14, α = 
.94). To avoid sequence effects, we randomized the sequence of the memory 
and attitude measure for both questionnaires.
Participants’ judgment-formation strategy was assessed using items 
derived from the scale developed by Matthes et al. (2007). Since this scale 
was constructed to measure immediate and memory-based judgment-forma-
tion in surveys and, hence, for (political) issues people have already heard 
about, we had to change the items slightly. We took two items asking for imme-
diate judgment-formation strategy (“I knew immediately how I stood on that 
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new bowel cancer test” and “While reading that article, I had already formed a 
concrete opinion”) and two items asking for memory-based judgment-forma-
tion strategy (“When asked about the bowel cancer test, I had to recall all 
arguments first” and “Not until I was asked about my opinion on the bowel 
cancer test, had I considered what arguments spoke in favor of it and what 
spoke against it”; t1: M = 3.94, SD = 0.91, α = .82; t2: M = 3.53, SD = 0.96, 
α = .78).
Results
The backfire effect occurs when people erroneously remember misinforma-
tion as true: they actually remember having heard a statement before, but are 
wrong about its original truth value. Consequently, in line with Skurnik et al. 
(2005), we only included statements in the analysis that had been presented 
in the stimulus article and that participants correctly remembered as being 
part of the stimulus (meaning that they did not label them as “new”). Thus, 
there are two different types of errors that can occur: labeling an originally 
false statement as true (backfire error) or labeling an originally true statement 
as false (fact-false error). If participants randomly guessed at the truth of 
statements, then both errors would occur in equal measure. However, in line 
with previous research, we expected backfire errors to occur more often than 
fact-false errors (Hypothesis 1a) and that this effect would strengthen after a 
delay (Hypothesis 1b). We calculated a 2 (type of error) × 2 (short vs. long 
delay) mixed ANOVA on the error rates. The analysis revealed a significant 
main effect for the type of error: participants more often remembered origi-
nally false statements as true (backfire error; M = 0.18, SD = 0.24) than origi-
nally true statements as false (fact-false error; M = 0.05, SD = 0.13), 
F(1, 329) = 113.18, p < .001, ηpartial
2 26= . ;  Hypothesis 1a was thus con-
firmed. Furthermore, there was a significant main effect for delay,2 with par-
ticipants making more errors after 5 days (t1: M = 0.08, SD = 0.16; t2: 
M = 0.15, SD = 0.21), F(1, 329) = 91.84, p < .001, ηpartial
2 22= . .  The signifi-
cant interaction effect confirmed Hypothesis 1b: While backfire errors 
increased considerably after a 5-day delay (t1: M = 0.12, SD = 0.21; t2: M = 
0.23, SD = 0.28), fact-false errors only slightly increased (t1: M = 0.03, SD = 
0.10; t2: M = 0.07, SD = 0.15), F(1, 329) = 14.84, p < .001, ηpartial
2 04= . .
To test whether there was a relationship between backfire errors and atti-
tude, we calculated correlations between the two variables. After the short 
delay, we found a small but significant correlation, r(334) = .18, p < .001; this 
means that the more originally false statements participants erroneously 
remembered as true (e.g., thinking that the false statement “The bowel cancer 
test is more effective than conventional screenings” was true), the more 
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favorable their attitudes toward the bowel cancer test were. After 5 days, this 
correlation was even more pronounced, r(328) = .31, p < .001. Thus, Hypothesis 
1c can be confirmed. However, the difference between the two correlation 
coefficients did not reach statistical significance, z score = −1.77, p = .08.
In a second step, we examined the influence of the judgment-formation 
strategy. In line with prior research, we manipulated immediate versus mem-
ory-based judgments via instructions. For a manipulation check, we calcu-
lated an index of the four items that measured the judgment-formation 
strategy via self-report (Matthes et al., 2007). Higher values indicated that 
participants formed immediate judgments; lower values indicated a memory-
based judgment-formation strategy. An independent t test revealed signifi-
cant results between participants that received an instruction for immediate 
judgments (M = 4.07, SD = 0.85) and participants that read an instruction for 
memory-based judgments (M = 3.80, SD = 0.96), t(333) = 2.79, p < .01, d = 
.30. Yet, although scoring significantly lower than participants who formed 
immediate judgments, those in the memory-based group also reported that 
they mostly formed judgments during reception. To deal with this, we used 
the self-report measurement to distinguish between immediate and memory-
based judgments. Since we asked for the judgment-formation strategy shortly 
after the stimulus as well as after a 5-day delay, we divided the groups based 
on both measures: The immediate judgment group consisted of participants 
that scored higher than 3 on both judgment-formation strategy measures (n = 
167); participants in the memory-based judgment group had to score 3 or 
lower on both measures (n = 46). All other participants were excluded from 
further analysis. Both groups did not differ significantly regarding gender, 
χ2(N = 213) = 0.21, p = .73, age, t(211) = −0.55, p = .58, education, χ2(N = 
213) = 2.45, p = .65, and with regard to the time they spent reading the article, 
t(211) = −0.82, p = .41.
We calculated a 2 (judgment-formation strategy) × 2 (short vs. long delay) 
mixed ANOVA on the backfire error rate. Results showed a significant main 
effect for judgment-formation strategy: Participants that formed memory-
based judgments erroneously remembered originally false statements as true 
about twice as often (M = 0.31, SD = 0.32) as participants that formed imme-
diate judgments did (M = 0.16, SD = 0.23), F(1, 208) = 17.63, p < .001, 
ηpartial
2 08= . .  Hypothesis 2a was thus confirmed. Furthermore, there was a 
significant interaction effect, indicating that backfire errors increased consid-
erably for participants with memory-based judgments after 5 days (t1: M = 
0.20, SD = 0.30; t2: M = 0.43, SD = 0.34), but that these were less for people 
who formed immediate judgments (t1: M = 0.12, SD = 0.20; t2: M = 0.20, 
SD = 0.25), F(1, 208) = 11.46, p < .001, ηpartial
2 05= . .  Thus, there was also 
support for Hypothesis 2b.
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However, we wanted to make sure that participants with memory-based 
judgments were systematically more prone to backfire errors and were not 
just making more errors in general. Therefore, we calculated a separate 2 
(judgment-formation strategy) × 2 (short vs. long delay) mixed ANOVA on 
the fact-false error rate. There was no significant main effect for judgment-
formation strategy: Participants with memory-based judgments did not 
remember facts as false (M = 0.15, SD = 0.22) more often than participants 
with immediate judgments did (M = 0.12, SD = 0.19), F(1, 205) = 1.03, p = 
.31, ηpartial
2 01= . .  Furthermore, there was no significant interaction effect, 
since fact-false errors increased for both strategies equally after the delay, 
F(1, 208) = 0.13, p = .72, ηpartial
2 001= . .
Finally, we expected the attitudes of participants with memory-based 
judgments to be rather unstable and depend on the number of backfire 
errors they made, while the attitudes for people with immediate judgments 
should not depend on backfire errors (Hypothesis 2d). Consequently, the 
correlation between attitudes reported after a short versus long delay 
should be significantly stronger for participants with immediate judgments 
compared to participants with memory-based judgments (Hypothesis 2c). 
To test these assumptions, we calculated separate regression models for 
immediate and memory-based judgment-formation strategies, with the 
attitude t2 as the outcome variable, and attitude t1 as well as the backfire 
errors t2 as predictors. As expected, for participants with immediate judg-
ments, their attitudes formed shortly after reception were the only signifi-
cant predictor for the attitudes after 5 days, β = .82, p < .001; the number 
of backfire errors made after 5 days scarcely affected the attitudes reported, 
β = .08, p = .08; in total, 71.4% of variance could be explained by this 
model, F(2, 163) = 207.17, p < .001. For participants with memory-based 
judgments, a different pattern emerged: Here, both the attitude t1, β = .47, 
p < .001, as well as the backfire errors t2, β = .28, p < .05, were significant 
predictors for the attitude reported after 5 days, F(2, 24) = 14.04, p < .001, 
R2 = 37.2. Furthermore, we checked whether the slopes differed signifi-
cantly (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003): As assumed, attitudes at t1 
predicted significantly stronger attitudes at t2 when people formed imme-
diate judgments (β = .82) than when people formed memory-based judg-
ments (β = .47), t(205) = 3.08, p = .002. Thus, the results confirmed both 
Hypotheses 2c and 2d. Furthermore, the fact that the attitudes of partici-
pants with memory-based judgments reported after 5 days were influenced 
by backfire errors led them to hold more favorable attitudes toward the 
bowel cancer screening test (M = 3.45, SD = 0.72) than participants with 
immediate judgments did (M = 3.16, SD = 1.32), t(135) = −1.97, p < .05, 
d = .27.
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Discussion
Myths existing in the population can have serious consequences, since 
(important) decisions are guided by intentions and attitudes, which are based 
on past experiences, and on information that we have gathered in our every-
day life (Ajzen, 1985, 1991). Although myths and facts stories seem like an 
elegant way of communicating scientific information to the public, the results 
of the present study provide evidence for detrimental effects of correcting 
false information. In line with prior research, we found evidence that the 
backfire effect is a rather robust and systematic error (Lewandowsky et al., 
2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Schwarz et al., 2007; Skurnik et al., 2005). The 
study shows that after only a few minutes, people start to misremember origi-
nally false information as true, but only rarely misremember facts as false. 
After a delay of several days, about one out of four originally false statements 
is erroneously remembered as a fact, leading people to believe, for example, 
that the presented bowel cancer test is recommended by independent IGeL 
monitoring—although the presented article not only identified this statement 
as false but also pronounced that the IGeL monitoring rates the benefit of this 
test as uncertain due to a lack of scientific evidence.
Furthermore, we were able to confirm a connection between backfire 
errors and participants’ attitudes that also slightly increased over time: The 
more false statements (such as “The bowel cancer test is recommended by 
independent IGeL monitoring”) participants misremembered as true, the 
more favorable their attitudes toward the test became. This result shows that 
the backfire effect has momentous consequences: People not only systemati-
cally misremember the truth of misinformation but also change their attitudes 
accordingly. To further investigate this connection, we integrated research on 
the judgment-formation strategy. Our results show that participants that did 
not form an attitude during reception (memory-based judgments) make sig-
nificantly more backfire errors than people with existing attitudes do, even 
after a delay of only a few minutes. After 5 days, people that did not form 
attitudes during reception wrongfully remember almost half of the false state-
ments as true. Apart from that, after 5 days, the attitudes of participants who 
formed immediate judgments were not influenced by the backfire mistakes 
they made but by their attitude they reported directly after the reception of the 
stimulus; it accounted for almost 70% of the variance. The fact that these 
participants make backfire errors after 5 days (although only half as much as 
the memory-based group do), but that these errors did not affect their attitude, 
provides further evidence that they simply recall the attitude they formed dur-
ing reading the stimulus without including further information that they 
(mis-)remember. At the same time, the fact that they make only half as many 
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backfire mistakes as persons with memory-based attitudes do indicates that 
they can use their attitudes stored in memory as an anchor for assessing the 
truth of the statements. In contrast, after a few days, participants in the 
memory-based group based their attitude both on the attitude they stated 
directly after the stimulus as well as on the backfire mistakes they made.
Limitations
It has to be noted that the current study is of course limited in various ways. 
First, the manipulation of the judgment-formation strategy has not worked 
adequately, even though we used the same instructions as prior experiments 
did. These experiments, however, did not control whether their manipulation 
was indeed successful (Bizer et al., 2006; Hamilton et al., 1999; Hastie & 
Park, 1986; Mackie & Asuncion, 1990; Tormala & Petty, 2001). We, for the 
first time, checked the effectiveness of this common manipulation with the 
scale developed by Matthes et al. (2007) and revealed a problem that should 
be considered in future studies: Though our treatment guided participants 
slightly toward the respective judgment-formation strategies (and the differ-
ence between the two conditions was highly significant), participants gener-
ally had a tendency for forming immediate judgments. As Hastie and Park 
(1986) already remarked, this might be a problem with the experimental situ-
ation: Respondents are quite aware that they will be asked questions after, for 
example, reading an article. Yet, as discussed, a memory-based judgment-
formation strategy is applied especially when people are unaware that they 
will have to report on a judgment later (Hastie & Park, 1986). Thus, it seems 
that a distraction task cannot fully prevent participants from forming attitudes 
toward an issue presented during an experiment. We dealt with this problem 
by splitting participants post hoc in the respective groups; by doing so, we 
ensured that we indeed compared respondents that formed their attitudes dur-
ing reception of the stimulus presentation with participants that formed their 
attitudes only when asked for them. This approach, however, gives rise to a 
second limitation of the current study: the question of causality. In contrast to 
the random assignment to both groups, the post hoc split makes it impossible 
to demonstrate with certainty that differences between the two groups are due 
to a causal link between the treatment and our observed variables. Differences 
between participants who formed immediate judgments and those with 
memory-based judgments might also be due to another systematic factor. 
However, we showed that the two groups did at least not differ significantly 
regarding age, gender, education, and the time they spent on reading the arti-
cle. This problem of causal inference also applies to the question as to whether 
the backfire effect affects attitudes or whether this relationship is the other 
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way round and attitudes affect backfire effects. We tried to minimize this 
threat to internal validity by basing our assumptions on well-justified and 
plausible theoretical considerations.
Third, conducting this study online caused the problem that we could not 
force participants to answer the second questionnaire exactly after 5 days. 
Hence, the amount of time between the first and the second measure differed 
somewhat. However, we ensured that at least 2 days had elapsed between 
stimulus presentation and the second data collection. Moreover, around half 
of the respondents filled out the questionnaire exactly after 5 days. Finally, 
we were able to show that the number of errors was independent of how 
many days had passed between both measurements.
Implications and Future Research Directions
The present study again confirms that the backfire effect is a systematic error. 
It not only occurs in the context of information campaigns (as tested by Skurnik 
et al., 2007) but also in the context of journalistic coverage. Furthermore, the 
fact that the participants in our study read more than one article (as they nor-
mally would during newspaper reception) causes the effect to occur even after 
a short delay of only a few minutes. Taking into account how much information 
on different topics people are confronted with every day, we might even have 
underestimated the strength of this phenomenon to date.
In addition to the study by Skurnik et al. (2007), we were able to show that 
the backfire effect not only occurs when statements with a rather negative 
valence (e.g., “Side effects of the flu vaccination are worse than the flu”) are 
labeled as false but also when positive statements are identified as myths 
(e.g., “The bowel cancer test is recommended by independent IGeL monitor-
ing”). This is important insofar as studies in the context of framing research 
have shown that negative statements are per se more likely to be rated as true 
than positive ones are (Hilbig, 2009, 2012; Koch et al., 2013). Admittedly, to 
control for this bias, the valence of statements needs to be manipulated within 
an experimental design.
The occurrence of the backfire effect in the context of journalistic myths 
and facts stories implies that the risk of corrected misinformation backfiring 
is not limited to the medical sector, since this type of journalistic article deals 
with a variety of issues. Recently, a quality newspaper tried to rectify com-
mon myths about the Sinti and Romanies: It did so by printing out several 
myths (e.g., “Sinti and Romanies are often criminals”) in bold letters and then 
correcting them with scientific data (e.g., “There is scientific evidence that 
Sinti and Romanies are not more often criminals than the majority of the 
population”). Based on the results of the present study, there is reason to fear 
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that such an article might even strengthen prejudice against minorities. 
Furthermore, we were able to show that erroneous memory in terms of mis-
information can have severe consequences, since it influences people’s atti-
tudes toward an issue. As prior research has consistently shown that people 
base their actions on attitudes (for an overview, see Fishbein & Ajzen, 2005), 
the backfire effect might be far more problematic than previously assumed.
The results for the judgment-formation strategy have two important impli-
cations: first, forming a judgment during reception significantly reduces 
backfire effects and leads people to be better at telling which information was 
actually true and which was false. Second, and even more important, the fact 
that people with existing attitudes erroneously remember misinformation as 
true in some cases does not affect their attitudes: If they have formed a posi-
tive attitude toward a presented issue, they will keep this attitude regardless 
of what they remember. This fact is crucial for information campaigns about 
medical myths: For example, if people read an information campaign that 
corrects misinformation about the threats of the cervical cancer vaccination 
and form a rather positive attitude about that vaccination during reception, it 
is likely that they will keep this positive attitude even if they are unsure about 
the truth of single arguments later.
Taking these results together, there are two main recommendations for 
designing information campaigns that deal with immediate correction of mis-
information or—as in our stimuli—for journalistic myths and facts stories: 
First, journalists could try to work only with facts and not repeat common 
myths about the issue at all (Skurnik et al., 2007). Yet this might bear the risk 
that facts and myths will coexist in people’s memory. A second strategy could 
benefit from the results regarding judgment-formation strategies: If cam-
paign designers or journalists repeat myths to correct them, they should 
encourage readers to form attitudes during reception, for example, by insert-
ing claims like “What is your opinion?” or “Make up your mind!” If such 
indications are in fact sufficient in triggering immediate judgments, this 
needs to be investigated by future research. However, it has to be noted that 
such claims may only be helpful in debunking myths for journalistic myths 
and facts stories or information campaigns where myths are immediately rec-
tified. If myths are published and only rectified after some time has passed 
(as in our introductory example regarding the MMR vaccination), triggering 
immediate judgments may not have any benefits or might even be counter-
productive by contributing to the solidification of a myth.
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Notes
1. We thank one of the reviewers for pointing out that the original term “on-line” 
can be misleading since nowadays it refers almost exclusively to Internet usage. 
To avoid confusion, we decided to relabel this judgment-formation strategy in 
the present article.
2. To make sure that the different time spans between t1 and t2 did not affect the 
results, we calculated correlations between days passed and errors. Results show 
that the number of days passed between t1 and t2 does not affect how many 
errors participants make after a delay; backfire: r(332) = .001, p = .99; fact-false: 
r(332) = .07, p = .24.
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